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[L. A. No. 22209. In Bank; Jan. 13, 1954.] 
Guardianship of the Person and Estate of LELAND SMITH 
et aL, Minors. FRIEDA HOWES, as Guardian etc., 
Respondent, v. HARRY COHEN, Appellant. 
[1] Guardian and Ward---:Selection of Guardian-Appointment of 
Parent Against Nonparent.-Where mother of illegitimate 
minor children is dead and court found that both older daugh-
ter and natural father are "fit and proper" persons .to. be 
guardians of the minors and have their custody and control, 
but where it appears that additional consideration of factual 
issues· is needed, an order appointing older daughter as 
guardian of the persons of such minors on ground that it 
would be to their "best interests and welfare" will be reversed 
on father's appeal on judgment roll alone, thus setting at large 
all issues of fact for redetermination by trial court. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County appointing guardian. Arnold Praeger, 
Judge. Reversed. 
Hahn, Ross & Saunders and Saul Rosf) for Appellant. 
Clore Warne and.Maxwell E. Greenberg, as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Appellant. 
Juaneita .. M. Veron for Respondent. 
Oswald G. Ingold as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-[1] Frieda Howes petitioned to be ap-
poi!lted the guardian of the persons of Leland Smith, a minor 
of8, and Sharon Smith, a minor of 6, brother and sister. She 
alleged that she is the sister of the minors; their mother is 
dead; their .father is Harry Cohen and aU reside in Los 
Angeles, California; that the minors are now under her care 
and she has supplied and cared for them since the death of 
their mother; their.''natural" father, Cohen, has "remarried" 
and has a family· of the second marriage; that the only rela-
tives of the minors are their father, petitioner, and a brother, 
[1] See Cal.Jur.,. Guardian and Ward, § 13; Am.Jur., Guardian 
and Ward,§ 29. 
McK. Dig. Reference: tl] Guardian and Ward,§ 13. 
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estate. Cohen filed 
quested tllat he be 
"natural" father of 
children of Cohen and 
mother. 




of both Frieda and 
Cohen are true; that both Frieda and Cohen are "fit and 
proper" persons to be the of the minors and have 
their and control; and that it is "to the best interest 
and welfare'' of the minors that be guardian. 
It was so ordered and Cohen He asserts that being 
the father of the are illeg·itimate, he 
has preference in the selection of their guardian, he being a fit 
and proper person. 
It is settled in this state that in either guardianship pro-
ceedings or in a divorce action, the 
parents of a over a non-
parent and the shalt not be to a nonparent un-
less the parent is found unfit. "'Where a parent applying for 
custody is in a to take the child and is not shown 
to be unfit, the court may not award to strangers 
merely because it feels that may be more fit & that they 
may be more able to educational, social, or 
other benefits. . . . [ he discretionary power 
of a trial court those provisions of 
of the Legislature re-
garding general are set forth ( Civ. Code, 
§§ 138, 197; Prob. and by the judicial 
interpretation of those in relation to the 
specific the instant case.' (Robertson 
v. Robertson, 72 132 [164 P.2d 52].) Section 
1407 of the Probate that as between persons 
equally entitled in other to the guardianship of a 
minor preference is to be first to a parent. This section 
has been construed to be substantially the same as former 
section 246 ( 3) of the Ci vii Code and section 1751 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure which in substance, that a parent 
if competent is entitled to in preference to any other 
person. Section 138 of the Civil Code provides that as be-
tween parents claiming the custody, neither parent 
is entitled to it as of but other things being equal, if 
the child is of tender years it should be given to the mother; 
if it is of an age to require education and preparation for 
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labor and then to the father. The code sections con-
template that the care of a minor child be awarded to a parent, 
if a fit and proper person, a stranger.'' (Stewart 
v. Stewart, 41 Oal.2d 451 P .. 2d 44] .) 
Here the Cohen, the father, was found fit rather 
than unfit and the mother is dead. The difference in 
this case is that the minors vvere not the legitimate issue of 
Cohen, but that is not 
"'When the motber and father of an illegitimate child are 
both alive and he has not been the mother is 
entitled to his services and earnings to the exclusion 
of the father. r Civ. § 200; In re 65 Cal.App. 
617 [224 P. 784]; 91 Cal.App.2d 336 [205 
P.2d 48] ; 51 A.L.R. 1507.) Both tlw mother and the father 
are responsible for his ( Civ. § § 196a, 196; 
Schumm v. 37 Ca1.2d 174 P.2d 39, 21 A.L.R.2d 
1051] ; Reed v. 23 Oal.2c1 336 [144 P.2d 561].) 
On the death of the mother the natnral father is entitled to 
the custody of an illegitimate child if he is a fit person. (See 
Commonwealth v. 142 Pa.Super. 98 [15 A.2d 518] ; 
Hayes v. 151 Va. 136 S.E. 432]; Aycock v. 
liampton, 84 Miss. 204 So. 245, 105 Am.St.Rep. 424, 65 
L.R.A. 689]; JJfon:tz v. 7 Watts (Pa.) 302 [32 
Am.Dec. 762] ; v. 272 App.Dlv. 79 [69 N.Y.S. 
2d 462], afl'md. 297 N.Y. N.E.2d 8] .) It has been 
held repeatedly that, while the best interests of an illegitimate 
child are the the of such a child have 
a superior claim as the world to his. custody if they 
are fit and proper. (Mo.App.) 292 S.W. 
447, mother; Jensen 63 Utah 604 [228 P. 217], 
mother; In re ~upra, 65 617, mother; Ex pade 
Wallace, 26 N.1VL 181 , father; Garrett v. 
JJ1ahaley, 199 Ala. 606 , father; Lewis v. Cro1J.!ell, 
210 Ala. 199 [97 So. v. 1Y1 eredith, s~tpra, 
69 N.Y.S.2d affmd. N.E.2d 8] ; State 
v. Nestaval, 72 Minn. 415 Jackson v. Luckie, 
205 Ga. 100 [52 S.E.2d Schwartzkopf, 149 
Neb. 460 [31 N.W.2d 131 N.,J. 404 
.2d 6301 ; French v. Leagtte, 69 
N.E.2d1 ; Cmmnonwea!th ex rel.llttman 
64 lL2d 447] ; Templeton v. 
) 179 S.W.2d 811; Henderson v. Hen-
derson, 187 Va. J21 [46 S.E.2d 101; Petition of DickhoUz, 
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341 Ill.App. 400 [94 N.E.2d 89]; 7 Am .• Jur., Bastards, §§ 61-
66; 10 C.J.S., Bastards, § 17; 51 A.L.R. 1507.) 
There is an additional factor iu the instant case. As far 
as appears the minors have not been legitimated. By award-
ing their custody to the father they are more likely to be 
legitimated because ''The father of an illegitimate child, by 
publicly acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as such, 
with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into his family, 
and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate child, 
thereby adopts it as such; and such child is thereupon deemed 
for all purposes legitimate from the time of its birth." ( Civ. 
Code, § 230.) Unless the father has the right to custody it is 
not probable that he will receive the minors into his home and 
thus legitimate them. 
This being a judgment roll appeal and the ground of re-
versal being that the order appealed from is not supported 
by the findings, the question is presented as to whether there 
should be a general reversal or a reversal with direction to 
the trial court to enter an order appointing appellant guardian 
of the persons of the minors here involved. Section 53 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure provides in part : ''The Supreme 
Court, and the District Courts of Appeal, may affirm, reverse, 
or modify any judgment or order appealed from, and may 
direct the proper judgment or order, or direct a new trial 
or further proceedings to be had.'' A proper construction of 
the foregoing provision would seem to be that in a case such 
as this, this court may, in its discretion, order a general re-
versal which means that the case is set at large and the issues 
of fact must be retried, or may direct the trial court to enter 
an order appointing appellant guardian of the minors in the 
place of respondent in accordance with the views herein ex-
pressed. In view of our conclusion that the trial court may 
desire to give further consideration to the factual matters 
presented, we deem it appropriate to order a general reversal 
of the order, thus setting at large all of the issues of fact 
for a redetermination by the trial court. 
The order is reversed. 
Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment. 
The objection to the rule that custody must be awarded 
to the parent unless he is unfit carries the harsh implication 
that the interests of the child are subordinated to those of 
1 
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the parent when the trial court has found that the best in-
terests of the child would be served by giving his custody to 
another. 'l'he heart of the problem, however, is how the 
best interests of the child are to be served. Is the trial 
court more sensitive than the parent to what the child's best 
interests are, better qualified to determine how they are to 
be served~ It would seem inherent in the very concept of a 
fit parent that such a parent would be at least as responsive 
as the trial court, and very probably more so, to the best 
interests of the child. The rule requiring that custody be 
awarded to such a parent in preference to a stranger does not 
operate to subordinate the interests of the child to those of 
the parent; it merely serves to define the area of the parent's 
responsibility for the welfare of the child. The court's 
statutory duty to be ''guided by what appears to be for the 
best interests of the child in respect to its temporal and 
mental and moral welfare" (Prob. Code, § 1406) encompasses 
the view that the child's welfare is part of the responsibility 
of a fit parent. 
One gains perspective by recalling that families are ordi-
narily allowed to function without outside interference though 
their wisdom in the upbringing of children may vary as 
widely as the physical heritage or economic advantages they 
give their children. Unless the upbringing of the child is so 
defective as to call for action by the juvenile court, it is un-
likely that an outsider will challenge the parental custody 
or seek by legal process to prove that the child's welfare 
would best be served elsewhere. It is generally understood 
that the stability of established family units would be jeopard-
ized by outside interference. 
It is only when the family is dissolved by death, divorce 
or separation that conflicting claims to custody are likely to 
arise. If the parents are divorced and no third parties are 
involved, the court of necessity arbitrates whatever conflicting 
claims the parents may have to the custody of the children. 
If one parent dies, however, or upon divorce is unable or unfit 
to have custody of a child, outsiders may enter the picture 
and attack the competence of the other parent to have cus-
tody or contend that the child would be better off with them. 
'l'he problem may also arise if the parent awarded custody 
at the time of divorce dies or for other reasons is no longer 
able to care for the child, or if one or both parents have 
through necessity been unable for a time to care for the child 
96 GUARDlANSHIP OF SMITH [42 C.2d 
but from out-
siders whose ac:sistanee interim. 
Ordinarily in any of these circumstances the determination 
of what course will best serve the interests of the child will 
involve the consideration of numerous imponderables. All 
things equal, it is clear that the parent should have 
custody. All things are not however. The 
outsider may be able to offer the child material ad-
vantages. In the case of the death of the parent having 
custody after the child may be on more intimate terms 
with relatives or a new spouse of the deceased parent than 
vvith the other parent who has not had custody. If the child 
has not been in the custody of either he may have been 
successfully into the home of the person who has 
been for him. The custody may have 
remarried so that if is awarded to him, the child will 
be faced with the problem of to a stepparent. On 
the other hand, the the relationship 
between a natural child cannot be gainsaid. 
Even in a case where the foster treats the child as his 
own, the child may still suffer from the lack of a natural 
parent in the eyes of his or natural children or 
other relatives of his foster parent may discriminate against 
him. If he gets into members of his foster family 
may be tempted to out that he is not really one of them. 
Moreover, even if the child is to make some sacrifice 
to be with his natural parent or to a new environment, 
it does not necessarily follow that his welfare will be corre-
spondingly impaired. It may not be to the best interest of 
the child to have every advantage. He may derive benefits by 
subordinating his immediate interests to the development of 
a ne1v family with his own parent, by giving as 
well as receiving. although a change in custody from 
an outsider to a may involve the disruption of a satis-
factory status quo, it may lead to a more desirable relationship 
in the long run. 
The facts of the case aptly illustrate the problem. 
'fhe two children lived with their mother and half sister 
until their mother's death. At that time they were 8 and 
6 years of age. 'l'heir home was disrupted their mother's 
death, and both their half sister and their father now seek 
their custody. The trial court has found that both are fit 
and proper persons. It may be assumed that the children 
wish to stay with their sister and that their lives will be 
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Jess disrupted at this time if they are allowed to remain with 
tl1c relative they know best. On the other hand, unless ens-
is given to their father they will remain to all intents and 
purposes orphans. If their friends inquire about their father 
they will either have to fabricate a story or admit their 
illegitimacy. If their sister marries, her husband might be 
unwilling to have them in his home. If the children are 
awarded to their father, they will become legitimate. ( Civ. 
§ 230.) They will be placed in a normal home en-
vironment with one natural parent and will suffer social 
embarrassment only to the extent that their past may become 
known to their friends. In all likelihood the care and support 
they will receive from their father will be greater if they move 
into his home than if they remain essentially strangers to him. 
There are thus many considerations that support the con-
clusion that their best interests would be served by awarding 
custody to their father. There are also considerations that 
support the contrary conclusion of the trial court. 
Psychology is not an exact science. If expert testimony 
were introduced in eases such as this in all probability it 
would be in conflict. 'rhe ordinary judge as well as the 
ordinary parent lacks the omniscience aecurately to evaluate 
all of the various considerations that may enter into a custody 
problem. '' 'rhe essenee of custody is the companionship of 
the child and the right to make decisions regarding his care 
and control, education, health, and religion." (Lerner v. 
811.perior Cmlrt, 38 Cal.2d 676, 681 [242 P.2d 321].) If a 
parent is tit he will be vitally eoncerned with the best interests 
of his child. By leaving to him the responsibility as to how 
those interests will be best served the court simply recognizes 
that "It is cardinal with us that the eustody, eare and nurture 
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function 
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can 
neither supply nor hinder. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra, 
[268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 39 A.L.R. 468]. 
And it is in recognition of this that these decisions have 
respected the private realm of family life which the state 
cannot enter." (Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 
[64 S.Ct. 438, 88 hE(L 645].) 
Cases may arise in whieh the child's interests would be 
seriously prejudiced by awarding custody to his parent. In 
such cases, however, the parent's insistence on his right to 
custody despite the harm that would clearly result to his 
42 C.2d-4 
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child will itself be evidence of his unfitness. (In re Bensfield, 
102 Cal.App. 445, 449 [283 P. 112]; Guardianship of Casacl, 
106 Cal.Appo2d 134, 152 [234 Po2d 647] .) 
In the present case the appeal is upon the judgment roll 
alone, and for the purposes of this decision we must accept 
the finding of the trial court that the father is a fit and 
proper person to be appointed guardian of the children. It 
bears emphasis, however, that the father of an illegitimate 
child comes before the court in at best a questionable light. 
Although past indiscretions do not necessarily demonstrate 
present unfitness (P1·onty v. Pronty, 16 Cal.2d 190, 193-19L1 
[105 P.2d 295] ; In re Green, 192 Cal. 714, 721 [221 P. 903] ; 
see, also, Clarke v. Clarke, 35 Cal.2d 259, 261-262 [217 P.2d 
401]), such a father should be required to explain why he has 
not legitimated his child. A father who has the power to do 
so but does not, demonstrates his unfitness by his willingness 
to inflict upon his child the status of illegitimacy. Such a 
father must not be allowed to bargain with the court by 
offering to exercise his power to legitimate in exchange for 
custody. On the other hand, a desire to secure custody may 
be the outgrowth of a moral rehabilitation reflected in an 
effort to undo a past wrong by legitimating the child. 
A father may legitimate his child by marrying the mother 
(Civ. Code, § 215) or "by publicly acknowledging it as his 
own, receiving it as such, with the consent of his wife, if he 
is married, into his family, and otherwise treating it as if 
it were a legitimate child." ( Civ. Code, § 230.) On the record 
before us we must assume that the father did not legitimate 
his children because he was unable to do so. At the present 
time the father is married. To legitimate the children now 
he must have the consent of his wife to receive the children 
into his family. ( Civ. Code, § 230.) There is no express 
finding that his wife is willing to receive the children into 
the family. On retrial the father must establish that the 
children will be legitimated as a minimum prerequisite to 
establishing his fitness for appointment as guardian. 
SCHAUER, J.-1 dissent. 
'l'his is a judgment roll appeal. The facts are not in dispute. 
The trial court found ''That both petitioner FRIEDA HowEs 
and counter petitioner HARRY CoHEN are fit and proper per-
sons to be the guardian of the minors herein, and to have 
their ... custody . 0 0 That it is to the best interest and 
welfare of said minor children that FRIEDA HowEs be ap-
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pointed guardian of their persons . . . '' The court also :found 
that the mother of said children is deceased and that "Peti-
tioner [adult sister of the minors] has supported and cared 
for said minors since the death of the mother" and that ap-
pellant is the natural father of the children and "is re-
married and has a family of the second marriage.'' Letters of 
guardianship ·were ordered issued to Frieda Howes. 
Appellant's sole ground for reversal is that on the findings, 
he, as the children's natural father who is not found "unfit," 
is as a matter of law entitled to judgment denying the peti-
tion of the children's sister and ordering the issuance of 
letters of guardianship to him. He argues, incidentally, that 
the finding ''That it is to the best interest and welfare of 
said minor children that FRIEDA HowEs be appointed guard-
ian'' is immaterial, and must be disregarded. The majority 
opinion sustains appellant's position in its entirety except 
that, even though this is a judgment roll appeal, it states 
that a reexamination of the evidence shall be had. 
Appellant does not aver that he desires custody and control 
of the children. He did not initiate proceedings seeking to 
be appointed guardian of these children and he does not allege 
that he ever has had them in his custody, or heretofore sought 
their custody, or that he ever has supported them. He 
appears only in response to the petition of Frieda and has 
contented himsel:f' with filing a document entitled '' OBJEC-
TIONS To APPOINTl\fENT OF GuARDIAN AND CouNTER-PETITION 
FOR APPOINTMEN'r OF GUARDIAN" wherein he merely "objects 
to the appointment of said FRIEDA HowEs as the Guardian 
of said children and desires that if it is deerned by the Court 
necessaTy that a Guardian be appointed, that he be appointed 
Guardian of said children." (Italics added.) It is also noted 
that in Frieda's petition for appointment as guardian the 
word ''illegitimate'' does not appear; the name of the mother 
does not appear; the fact of nonmarriage is not alleged; the 
pertinent and sufficient averments in respect to the mother 
are the simple words "Mother deceased." How different are 
appellant's sensibilities! In his objections to Frieda's ap-
pointment he bluntly avers ''That said minor children are the 
illegitimate children of petitioner and their mother, MAR-
GUERITE SMITH, now deceased.'' 
How eloquently it thus appears on the face of the judg-
ment roll that even though appellant has not been adjudi-
cated "unfit," and has rather been decreed legally "fit," 
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whatever that may mean, he continues now to be as indifferent 
to the welfare of the children as, from the fact that they 
were born out of wedlock and that he does not claim to have 
ever had their custody,1 it could be inferred he has been 
from the beginning. Could it be that the real ground for 
appellant's objections to having the children's adult sister 
appointed their guardian is a fear that in the interests of 
these minors she might seek to compel this man to contribute 
suitably to their support~ 
And there is still further affirmative evidence in this record, 
mere judgment roll though it be, of appellant's lack of con-
cern for these children. Appellant asserts in his brief (and 
respondent concurs in this statem.ent) that the hearing on the 
guardianship matter "was extremely brief and was based 
principally upon the report of the Probation Officer and 
upon an interview in Chambers between the trial judge and 
the two minor children.'' The substance of the interview 
is not shown in the record and the preference expressed by 
the children does not specifically appear, but appellant urges 
that such preference "is immaterial." (Italics added.) Can 
we doubt what that preference is? 
Appellant argues further that "it is still the law of this 
State that a parent has a superior right to the custody of 
his minor children, provided only he is fit and proper to have 
such custody and regardless of whether or not it would be 
better for stteh children to be with a stranger." (Italics 
added.) Therefore, concludes appellant, the trial court ''in 
awarding the guardianship of the children ... to a stranger 
[their sister or half sister who was caring for and supporting 
them] against the wishes of the father who was a fit and 
proper person to have their custody, abused its discretion." 
It seems to me that on this record it is this court which abuses 
its discretion in reversing the order of the trial court. 
Let us look further at this record. Nowhere therein nor in 
his briefs does appellant come forth with a clear and un-
1 So far as the record on appeal shows appellant does not claim to 
have supported the children or even to have made any contribution toward 
their support. However, on the oral argument (at the first hearing) 
before us, one of the justices, going outside the recOTd, asked counsel for 
appellant '' Diil he ever support the children~'', and counsel replied 
"Yes." 'rhe inqt1iring justice also asked counsel for the respondent the 
question ''The father dld support these ehildren f '' and counsel re-
sponded ''The father contributed somewhat to their support, yes.'' 
There was no stipulation that the record should be augmented by adding 
all or any part of the quoted questions and unsworn answers, or that 
any of such "evidence" was before the trial court. 
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equivocal declaration that he is willing to support his chil-
dren, that he desires their personal custody, that he loves 
them and that he wants to best serve their welfare, and on 
that account wants to be their guardian; likewise he does 
not even state2 that he wishes to receive them into his family 
and otherwise treat them as if they were legitimate, either 
in order that they may thereby become legitimated as pro-
vided by the Civil Code ( § 230), or in order to see to it 
that their best interest and welfare are subserved in other 
respects as well. Rather, the whole tenor of appellant's 
pleadings, briefs, and arguments indicates that he is stepping 
carefully around an assertion that he now wishes to assume 
full responsibility for the children, instead suggests that his 
chief interest is that no one else be placed in a position to 
assert rights of the children as against him, and that any 
authority he may have over the children not be lost, as would 
result from the appointment of another as their guardian 
( Civ. Code, § 204, subd. 1.) The entire record tends to 
confirm the conclusional finding of the trial court that the 
best interest and welfare of the children lie with their sister, 
respondent herein, rather than with appellant; nevertheless, 
the majority of this court, even on this judgment roll appeal, 
impliedly question the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
such finding, and argue that certain elements of assumed 
evidence and implications of some of the findings tend to 
support a contrary finding that the interests of the children 
would be better served by placing them in the custody of 
the father. 
'rhis case appears to me to again illustrate the poignant 
undesirability, which I pointed out in my dissents in Roche 
v. Roche (1944), 25 Cal.2d 141, 144-149 [152 P.2d 999]; 
Stewart v. Stewart (1953), 41 Cal.2d 447 [260 P.2d 44] ; 
2Subsequent to the filing of this court's opinion when this cause was 
first befo1e it, and while respondent's petition for rehearing was pending, 
counsel for appellant addressed a letter to the court in which it is stated, 
among other things, that "It is very clear to appellant that the judgment 
of the trial court was reversed and that as a result thereof, no further 
hearing is neeessary . . . 
"Counsel for appellant is able to give this Court positive assuranee 
that immediately upon receipt of these children into the home of appel-
lant, these children will be legitimatized ... 
''Requiring legitimation as a pre-requisite to awarding guardianship 
is to put the cart before the horse ... '' 
It should be obvious that the letter from counsel was not before the 
trial court, is not in the record, is not signed by or binding on appellant, 
and cannot properly affect the disposition of a judgment roll appeal. 
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and Guardianship of Kentera (1953), 41 Cal.2d 639, 645 
[262 P.2d 317], of requiring the trial court to find a parent 
to be "unfit" before it can confide the custody of a child to 
another person, even when the child's best interests are found 
to be with others. Who can say what "fit" or "unfit" may 
mean to different judges? If the term be cheapened to mean 
less fit by comparison-and there are those who argue that 
such interpretation should be given to it-then the finding 
that the best interests of the children require that they be 
placed with one person rather than with another is in effect 
a finding that, by comparison, the latter is unfit. But why 
should these children, already bearing the burden of having 
illegitimate parents (which, as noted hereinabove, their father 
in this record has unnecessarily alleged and has evidenced 
no concern about removing) be further burdened with a find-
ing that their natural father is "unfit" to be their guardian? 
The statute does not require it. The children are both less 
than 10 years of age and it may well be that at some future 
time changed circumstances and changed attitudes of the 
father, and perhaps the wishes of the children themselves, 
will indicate that it would thereafter serve their best interest 
and welfare to be with the father. 
As declared in the dissent in the Roche case, it is my view 
that we should have confidence in trial judges and in the pro-
cesses of the law which enable them to view and hear at 
first hand the children, the parents and other claimants, and 
that their discretion in the premises should not be so rigidly 
limited as is done by the rule followed by the majority here. 
To require a trial court to find a parent "unfit" in order that 
it may accord the children their right to have their best 
interest and welfare promoted appears to me to be harsh, 
legalistic, unfair to both the children and the parent, and in 
contravention of the legislative intent. 
Regardless of differences of opinion as to the desirability 
of the rule as applied in the Roche case it is quite unnecessary 
to apply it here. For this holding today there is neither 
statute nor precedent requiring or supporting it. The hold-
ings of In re Campbell (1900), 130 Cal. 380 [62 P. 613], 
and In re Mathews (1917), 174 Cal. 679 [164 P. 8] (see, also, 
Estate of Wise (1918), 179 Cal. 423, 426 [177 P. 277]; In re 
Green (1923), 192 Cal. 714, 721 [221 P. 903]) that a parent 
of a minor child under 14 years of age, if found by the court 
to be ''competent to discharge the duties of guardianship'' 
was entitled to be appointed guardian in preference to a non-
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parent, regardless of the best interest of the child, are both 
based upon the specific language of the first sentence of former 
section 1751 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That sentence 
was, however, repealed in 1931, and not reenacted, although 
the other provisions of the section were reenacted as sections 
1406 and 1410 of the Probate Code. It thus appears that 
the Legislature, in recognition of what seems to me to be the 
protest expressed by this court in In re Mathews, supra, and 
Estate of Wise, supra, against statutes construed to require 
that the property right of a parent in a child be considered 
superior to the best interest and welfare of the child, wisely 
decided to, and did, remove such requirement from the law 
of this state. 
In the :Mathews case, decided in 1917, the court pointed out 
(p. 683 of 174 Cal.), that "It is argued with great force that 
the trend of modern decisions is to regard as of primary im-
portance the welfare of the minor himself. This is most true. 
The decisions to this effect are made either under the permis-
sion of the law, which contains no such restriction as that 
found [in 1917] in our section 1751, or else are given under 
the command of the law which, in effect, declares that over 
and above all else the controlling consideration shall be the 
welfare of the child. If we were thus at liberty to act, it 
might well be that the custody of this child, under the findings 
of the court, would be given to [the non parent with whom the 
child had been living for some 10 years] . . . '' 
It is therefore my view that the courts of this state are 
no longer required by statute to arbitrarily disregard the wel-
fare of the child whenever a legally "fit" parent is making 
claim, and need no longer adhere to the view expressed in 
In re Ca~npbell (1900), sup1·a, 130 Cal. 380, 382, that the 
right of the parent in the child is similar to that of the owner 
of property in his chattel and must ''be regarded as coming 
within the reason, if not within the strict letter, of the con-
stitutional provisions for the protection of property . . . " 
To place this property right conception of a parent's claim 
to children over and above the welfare of the children seems 
to me to be a throwback of generations if not of centuries. 
The mandate of our r~egislature as expressed in section 1406 
of the Probate Code is that "In appointing a general guardian 
of a minor, the court is to be guided by what appears to be 
for the best interest of the child in respect to its temporal 
and mental and moral welfare; and if the child is of sufficient 
age to form an intelligent preferenee, the court may consider 
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that preference in determining the question '' These 
provisions, when construed with the provision of section 1407 
of the same code, that ''Of persons equally entitled in other 
respects to the guardianship of a minor, preference is to be 
given as follows : ( 1) To a parent; . . . '' (italics added), 
appear to me to require that the first concern of the court 
should be directed toward determining "what appears to be 
for the best interest of the child in respect to its temporal 
and mental ancl moral ·welfare" (italics added) as specified by 
section 1406, and that only when the sum of all of these 
aspects of the child's \Velfare will be subserved equally well 
by having the parent as guardian will the parent's right be 
held as a matter of law superior. 
I am further of the view that such a philosophy, rather 
than tending toward the weakening of family relationships 
and the assumption of arbitrary state control over children, 
will work towards the contrary result. "Where, as here, al-
though the parent is found legally "fit," it does not appear 
that as between parent and child there ever has been a family 
relationship, and where the parent's concern for his children's 
welfare and his wish to serve their best interests are un-
established and appear to be highly questionable, how can it 
be considered that any family relationship that might be 
established with him would be more desirable than that here-
tofore and presently enjoyed by the children with their sister, 
respondent herein who, it seems, has cared for them as a labor 
of love? Is it not more likely that they will grow to mature, 
responsible adulthood, to take a useful place in society, when 
living in the home in which the trial court found their best 
interest resides, rather than being compelled to leave that home 
for such abode, if any, as the father may be inclined to 
designate? Although I believe there is no question but that 
in the vast majority of cases the best interest of the child will 
lie with the natural parent and that trial judges surely can 
be depended on to so find, it nevertheless seems to me that 
this case points up and again emphasizes the necessity, the 
justice, and the rightness, of permitting trial judges the 
exercise of a wise discretion in deciding problems of custody 
and guardianship of children. 'l'here are many things in this 
record which, in the interests of the children, seem to cry 
aloud for support of the trial court's order, yet none of those 
things suggests that the trial judge should have found the 
father to be "unfit" to have custody of children. Indeed 
it would have been a cruel and unnecessary act for the trial 
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v,ourt to have found the father "unfit" to have custody of 
ehildren, for there is another finding in the record. It is 
that this "Natural father is remarried and has a family of 
the second marriage.'' To this second family appellant well 
may be not only a legitimate husband and father but in 
truth a "natural" and a kindly, considerate one. Yet how-
ever fit he is in a legalistic sense, he may be the last one 
who, for the interests of the children, should be appointed 
their guardian. 
The findings establish that the children have no estate. 
Such findings also establisl1, directly or impliedly, that the 
appellant is the one person who is primarily liable for the 
support of the chiLdren and against whom the guardian 
should assert rights on behalf of the children. But this court 
holds that as a matter of law, since appellant is not legally 
"unfit," the welfare of the children cannot even be con-
sidered, let alone given effect. 
Although I have not discussed the question of illegitimacy 
as bearing upon any right of the father (except as it may be 
relevant before the trial court in determining what is for 
their best interest), it may be noted that while under the 
provisions of section 1403 of the Probate Code the consent of 
both parents, if living and capable of consent, is required 
for the appointment by will or deed of a guardian of a child, 
nevertheless the mother alone may make such appointment if 
the t:Ohild is illegitimate. Also, section 1405 of the same code 
provides that the court may appoint a guardian "when no 
guardian has been appointed ... by will or by deed ... " 
'l'hese sections would appear to me to cast further doubt upon 
the absolute legal right here sought to be asserted by appel-
lant-father. (See In re Britt (1917), 176 Cal. 177 [167 P. 
863]; In re Imperatrice (1920), 182 Cal. 355, 358 [188 P. 45] .) 
As already indicated there are some assumptions in the 
majority opinion, and some in the concurring opinion, which 
appear to be inconsistent with the trial court's findings, and 
to be indulged to the end of supporting a reversal rather 
than an affirmance. The majority and concurring opinions 
speak of a new trial. But this is a mere judgment roll appeal, 
and the reversal must be based on the findings or it is neces-
sarily in defiance of the strict direction of section 4% of article 
VI of the Constitution. Thus, as pointed out by counsel for 
appellant, there is no occasion for a new trial. On the 
majority holding appellant is, as a matter of law, entitled to 
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guardianship papers, yet both the majority and concurring 
opinions suggest a new trial. 
The majority say ''There is an additional factor in the in-
stant case. As far as appears the minors have not been 
legitimated. By awarding their custody to the father they 
are more likely to be legitimated ... Unless the father has 
the right to custody it is not probable that he will receive 
the minors into his home and thus legitimate them.'' This 
speculation as to the existence or nonexistence of facts and 
as to possible future events, and as to the effect thereof on 
the weight or sufficiency of the evidence supporting the find-
ing that it is to the best interest of the children that letters 
of guardianship issue to, and that they remain in the custody 
of, the respondent adult sister who has supported and cared 
for them since the death of their mother several years ago, 
has no legitimate place in an opinion disposing of a judgment 
roll appeal. 
It cannot lawfully be assumed that on a new trial there 
can be any evidence which would justify not awarding the 
children's guardianship to the father, because, on evidence 
which cannot be doubted, he has already been found to be 
fit and that finding, as a matter of law, it is held, entitles 
him to a reversal of the judgment. If on this record he is 
entitled to a reversal, a fortiori he is entitled to letters of 
guardianship without further hearing. This has to be true, 
because otherwise the majority would be reversing a judg-
ment without a showing of prejudice as required by section 
4% of article VI of the California Constitution and by sec-
tion 475 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The burden is on 
appellant to show prejudice, i.e., a miscarriage of justice. 
On this judgment roll appeal he cannot possibly show prej-
udice entitling him to a reversal unless on that record (upon 
the findings) he is entitled to judgment in his favor, which 
means the issuance of letters of guardianship on the going 
down of the remittitur. Therefore, this court, if it upholds 
the law, must sustain the award of letters of guardianship 
to appellant upon the going down of the remittitur without 
further hearing in the trial court. But evidencing at last 
some slight weakening in its self-made rule of thumb for 
award of custody it suggests that there should be a new trial. 
Also demanding mention, to avoid possible confusioi1, is 
the concurring opinion's statement (not concurred in by the 
majority) that ''On retrial the father must establish that 
the children will be legitimated as a minimum prerequisite 
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to establishing his fitness for appointment as guardian." This 
statement has no legitimate place in the opinion. As already 
mentioned repeatedly this is a judgment roll appeal. The 
evidence is not before us ; it is conclusively presumed to be 
sufficient to support all findings and the findings squarely 
determine that the appellant is a fit person to be appointed 
guardian of the children here concerned. But if there is to 
be a new trial it is to be hoped that the quoted statement 
will not be accepted by the trial court. To accept it might 
well work a manifest injustice to the appellant father, and to 
his wife, and occasion unnecessary suffering both to these 
children and to the presently legitimate children of appellant 
and his wife. It may be, or it may not be, to the best interests 
of the children involved here that they be taken into the home 
and family of appellant. There might develop a quite natural 
resentment on the part of the legitimate children of the 
established family to what they could consider to be an in-
trusion. Their remarks to neighborhood children could lead 
to cruelties and griefs which only the sensitive can fully 
understand and which only the callous would willfully inflict. 
'rhere can be far more sinister influences on the life of a child 
than the legal status of illegitimacy. If the appellant here 
has all the virtues which the concurring opinion assumes for 
him, then his good faith determination that the welfare of 
these children will best be served by not taking them into 
his household should be respected just as much as his possible 
determination to the contrary. In any event it is to me un-
thinkable that a trial court should find the appellant father 
here, if he is a good husband and father to his present family, 
to be "unfit" to have the custody of the children whose wel-
fare is here at stake. 
The extraordinary concept of "fitness" disclosed in the 
eoncurring opinion does not appear to, at least at this time, 
have the concurrence of any other justice of this court and is 
not, I think, likely to commend itself to many trial judges 
whose duty it is to deal face to face with live children and 
flesh and blood parents and custodians. Judges who handle 
such cases have, in my observation of their work, exhibited a 
high respect for the law, a conscientious fidelity to duty, and 
great wisdom and patience in seeking to determine the course 
that will best serve the interests of the children. Such judges, 
I think, are regretful that we arbitrarily deny to them the 
right to ron~ider the welfare of the children as opposed to a 
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custody claim of a parent unless the parent be found "unfit." 
The trial judge, when he is confronted with facts which in-
dicate that for a while the interests of a child imperatively 
demand placement with a person other than a parent, ordi-
narily uses that means to bridge the present emergency, and 
he looks to the future and possible restoration of the child to 
the custody of a parent (or parents) at a later date. The 
law, as enacted by the Legislature, contemplates such pro-
cedure and every custody order is subject to modification 
during the child's minority. A judge so engaged realizes 
that few domestic relations concepts could be more cruel in 
application and regrettable in result than a willingness to 
lightly-but necessarily publicly and indelibly-brand a 
parent as "unfit." Such branding would almost certainly 
mean that the parent could never hope to regain either the 
custody or respect or affection of his child; no more could 
the child hope to rejoin his parent. Such a branding could 
add immeasurably to the burdens and handicaps of the chil-
dren affected. And it would do all this without any necessity 
therefor, simply to satisfy a court-made rule which is adhered 
to in direct derogation of the legislative policy. 
It should further be pointed out that the concurring opinion, 
after at least suggesting lip service to the view that it would 
be harsh to place the rights of a ''fit'' parent above the best 
interests of the child, then goes on to assert that '"l'he heart 
of the problem, however, is how the best interests of the child 
are to be served. Is the trial court more sensitive than the 
parent to what the child's best interests are, better qualified 
to determine how they are to be served f It would seem 
inherent in the very concept of a fit parent that such a parent 
would be at least as responsive as the trial court, and very 
probably more so, to the best interests of the child." Such an 
assertion completely ignores the obvious fact that it is in 
controversies in which the parent's responsiveness to the best 
interests of the child has been called into question, that trial 
courts are called upon to determine where such interests lie, 
and that in such controversies our Constitution and the Legis-
lature have entrusted to trial courts exercising a proper dis-
cretion, rather than to either parents or appellate courts, 
the determination of the issue. I do not share at all the in-
dicated deprecatory view of the wisdom of trial judges and 
I would leave with them, appreciatively, the full scope of dis-
cretion given them by the Legislature in the handling of the 
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very difficult and dclieate problems which daily confront them 
in domestic relations court. 
I would affirm the order appealed from. 
EDMONDS, J.-In a proceeding to appoint a guardian for 
a minor child, the court must be g·uided ''by what appears to 
be the best interest of the child in respect to its temporal 
and mental and moral welfare." (Prob. Code,§ 1406.) The 
code provisions relating to the custody of a legitimate minor 
child, as construed in Roche v. Roche, 25 Cal.2d 141 [152 
P.2d 999], Stewart v. Stewart, 41 Cal.2d 447 [260 P.2d 44), 
and Gttardianship of Kentera, 41 Cal.2d 639 [262 P.2d 
317], are a legislative determination that the child's interest 
will be best served if the right of the natural parent to his 
custody is made paramount to that of a stranger. In this 
connection, section 197 of the Civil Code specifically provides 
that "[i}f either the father or mother [of a legitimate un-
married minor child} be dead or unable or refuse to take 
the custody or has abandoned his or her family, the other 
is entitled to its custody, services and earnings." 
There is no similar provision in regard to an illegitimate 
child. Section 200 of the Civil Code, which concerns the 
custody of such a child, gives that right to the mother without 
mention of the father's status upon her death. In short, 
there is no legislative determination that, when the mother 
is dead, the interest of the child will be better served by a 
custodial right in the father superior to that of any other 
person. 
The conclusion reached in the majority and concurring 
opinions is based upon the rule which governs judicial deter-
mination of the custody of legitimate children. But there 
is far less reason to suppose that the generally undesired 
child of an illicit relationship will enjoy the same paternal 
love and affection as that of a legitimate one. 
Great concern is expressed by my associates in regard to 
the probability of legitimating the child. According to 
Justice Carter, the child more likely will be legitimated if 
the father is given a paramount right to his custody. Justice 
Traynor takes the position that a willingness to legitimate the 
child is a minimum prerequisite to a showing of the father's 
fitness. 
The probability of legitimation is a consideration which 
cannot be too strongly emphasized. But in my opinion, there 
is no reasonable basis for concluding that a father will be 
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more moved to do what is right if he is given a paramount 
right to custody. To permit the trial judge to ascertain 
first that the child will be legitimated before awarding cus-
tody to the father and, in the absence of such action, to award 
custody to another qualified person would more nearly achieve 
that objective. Otherwise the trial judge must award custody 
to the father without assurance that the child will be legiti-
mated or, according to the alternative suggestion, may declare 
the father unfit if legitimation is not accomplished, despite 
the fact that the only hindrance may be the failure of his 
wife to consent. 
The trial court found that the best interests of the children 
will be served by giving their custody to Frieda Howes. The 
appeal being on the judgment roll, it must be presumed 
that the evidence supports that determination. If upon a 
future application it should be shown that the children's 
interests would be better served because of a change in con-
ditions of which legitimation of the children may be one, a 
different order may be made. But upon the present record, 
I would affirm the order of the trial court. 
Gibson, C. J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 22321. In Bank. Jan. 22, 1954.] 
THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. 
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA TELEPHONE CORPORA-
TION (a Corporation), Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Telegraphs and Telephones-Franchises-Privileges Granted 
by State-Acceptance.-By 1905 amendment of Civ. Code, 
§ 536 (now Pub. U til. Code, § 7901), the state offers to tele-
phone corporations a franchise to construct lines along or 
on any public road or highway, and franchise is accepted when 
such a corporation constructs its lines on public road or high-
way and maintains and operates a telephone system. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Telegraphs and Telephones, § 7; Am.Jur., Tele-
graphs and Telephones, § 28. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Telegraphs and Telephones, § 10; 
[2, 7, 8] Telegraphs and Telephones, § 11; [3, 4, 9-13] Telegraphs 
and Telephones, § 12; [5] Appeal and Error, § 1346; [6] In-
junctions, § 109 ( 5). 
